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Delicate and painstaking discussions on key points-definition of the State, commercial transac-
tions, contracts of employment (especially in diplomatic and consular missions), execution of
judgments, relationship with other international agreements, the possibility of reservations-led
to adoption of a text likely to be acceptable to developing countries and one which because of its
enforcement provisions is more effective and complete than the European Convention on State
Immunity.
The first part of the Round Table, on immunity and the right of access to justice, begins with
Professor Frederic Sudre's account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
He explains how the Court in Al-Adsani and related cases established two criteria by which any
limitation to Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights must be justified-that it
serves a legitimate purpose and that it is proportional to that purpose. Sudre is critical of the Court
for not examining with sufficient rigour whether domestic rules according state immunity were
required by international law and, in the Al-Adsani case, for giving insufficient weight to the ius
cogens character of the prohibition of torture.
Accounts of French practice by Regis de Gouttes, Advocate General at the Cour de Cassation,
and of Swiss practice by Judge Dominique Favre while in themselves full of interest do not
address this conflict between norms of international law. Hazel Fox however, covering cases in
the US, in Canada, and in the UK, sets out the three grounds on which it has been argued that the
human right of access to justice should 'trump' immunities-implied waiver by States, ius cogens
and a requirement of 'universal jurisdiction' over violations of international norms wherever
committed. She shows that all these arguments have found limited favour in domestic courts and
that they would if accepted lead to discrimination and uncertainty. Her conclusion is that discus-
sion should be directed not only to State immunity but to the provision of alternative remedies and
their efficacy.
Leading the accounts of State practice on immunity from execution in the second half of the
Round Table is Ronnie Abraham, Director of Legal Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He explains that in the absence of any internal law French courts apply customary inter-
national law and any relevant conventions such as headquarters agreements of international orga-
nizations. He does not explain why France never became a party to the European Convention on
State Immunity, but encouragingly he states that France could accept the new UN Convention and
sees no conflict between its terms and the European Convention on Human Rights.
Paul Lagarde, Professor Emeritus at the University of Paris, had the difficult task of formu-
lating general conclusions at the end of highly stimulating and lively debates. He found no magic
formula to reconcile immunities with the individual right of access to justice. He emphasizes that
States and international organizations also have commercial and competitive interests in formu-
lating predictable rules which limit immunities to the minimum, and that these interests have little
to do with international law, with the preservation of the independence of sovereign States or even
with the protection of human rights.
The reader of this entertaining and enlightening publication is left with the belief that the
recent emphasis on the right of access to justice will not further demolish or erode the immunities
of states and international organizations, but will require such immunities to be rigorously justi-
fied in terms of functional necessity when they are first accorded. It is evident that this has been
done during the negotiations for the new UN Convention and that the Convention will form a
better framework for state immunity than has been provided over the years by the somewhat frag-
mented and insular efforts of national courts.
EILEEN DENzA
Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives By Luc REYDAMS [OUP
Oxford 2003 xiv + 258pp ISBN 01-99251-62-2]
Some crimes are so odious that committing them makes one hostis generis humani (an enemy of
doi: 10. 1093/iclq/leiO34
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all mankind). Intuitively, the idea of a universal enemy implies the possibility of universal crimi-
nal jurisdiction (UCJ). As Luc Reydams notes, the notion of UCJ originated in the 16th century
with Covarruvias, although the idea is better known through Grotius's famous assertion that every
state has jurisdiction over 'gross violations of the law of nature and of nations, done to other states
and subjects' (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, AC Campbell trans., II.20.VII). For many years piracy was
the only recognized UCJ crime, not so much because of its moral awfulness, but because it was
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of all states; and the pirate was the original hostis
generis humani. In the 20th century, a number of multilateral treaties established UCJ over other
international crimes such as narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting, and aerial hijacking-crimes
whose repression requires the efforts of many nations because they involve conduct that crosses
borders. Typically, these treaties require parties (1) to enact domestic legislation criminalizing the
conduct in question; (2) either to extradite suspects in their custody or prosecute them themselves
(aut dedere aut prosequi); and (3) to establish criminal jurisdiction over the conduct regardless of
where it is committed. It is the third requirement that creates UCJ-what Reydams calls 'cooper-
ative' UCJ, because the aut dedere aut prosequi clause suggests prosecution under UCJ is meant
only 'to avoid an impasse which would otherwise result from the impossibility of extraditing a
foreign suspect. The ensuing prosecution can be seen as a form of bilateral co-operation in penal
criminal matters' (29).
Unilateral UCJ is also possible, and the Lotus principle apparently permits states to establish
it if they choose to. Notoriously, in 1999 Belgium established UCJ over genocide, crimes against
humanity, and certain war crimes. Within two years Belgium had launched investigations of
numerous world leaders, including Yasser Arafat, Fidel Castro, Ariel Sharon, several African
leaders, and others. In 2002, the ICJ decided a case brought by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo against Belgium (the Arrest Warrant case), ordering a Belgian arrest warrant for the
DCR's former foreign minister quashed. Although the Court decided the case on other grounds,
ten judges wrote separately on the UCJ issue. They divided almost evenly on whether unilateral
UCJ, exercised over a defendant not yet in custody, violates customary international law. Then,
in 2003, Iraqi victims of American bombing in the first Gulf War filed a Belgian case against high
US officials. The US responded by threatening to move NATO headquarters out of Brussels, and
Belgium quickly caved in to American pressure and rolled back its ambitious UCJ law. UCJ had
suffered a crushing defeat. But the validity of UCJ is hardly dead letter: another UCJ case
(between the Republic of Congo and France) is currently before the ICJ; and in 2004 American
lawyers filed a criminal complaint in Germany against US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
under Germany's UCJ statute. Given the limited capacity of international tribunals to process
cases, scholars continue to promote UCJ as an avenue for prosecuting international criminal cases.
A topic of such great interest cries out for a book-length treatment, but until Reydams's book,
none existed in English. Happily, Reydams's book does the job admirably. Reydams begins by
succinctly sketching the overall theory of international criminal jurisdiction. He then reviews the
history, theory, and doctrine of both co-operative and unilateral UCJ. Reydams's mastery of the
arguments and their historical context is enviable. He next explores UCJ in international treaties
and other instruments. Reydams's analysis shows that international criminal law treaties fall into
three categories: (1) the pre-Second World War treaties under which UCJ is explicitly subsidiary
to extradition, because the treaty stipulates that prosecution can occur only when extradition is
impossible; (2) the twenty-plus treaties that follow the pattern of the 1970 Hague Hijacking
Convention, incorporating aut dedere aut prosequi clauses without explicitly indicating that pros-
ecution is subsidiary to extradition; and (3) the Geneva Convention and Convention Against
Apartheid, which include UCJ clauses that do not employ the extradite-or-prosecute formula and
are therefore arguably 'unilateralist.'
In the second half of the book, Reydams provides an extraordinarily valuable country-by-
country survey of the UCJ jurisprudence of fourteen states. The survey is anything but dry, and in
places Reydams's language is sharp-as when he describes Belgium's UCJ experiment as 'a veri-
table juridical soap opera' (109), or points out (in his chapter on Spain) 'the peculiarity of ... a
former colonial power claim[ing] jurisdiction over human rights violations in its erstwhile
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colonies, while the crimes of a former repressive regime in the forum State remain covered with
the cloak of tolerance' (192).
As these quotations indicate, Reydams is no fan of unilateral UCJ, which he suggests may be
'an aberrant intermezzo between Nuremberg and the ICC' (226). Reydams criticizes the view that
treaty-based UCJ leaves states the option of also establishing non-subsidiary 'unilateral' UCJ
(230). But why? Treaties following the Hague Hijacking Convention include clauses stating that
the treaty 'does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with international
law.' Moreover, Reydams's own typology of treaties shows that at least the Geneva Conventions
and the Convention Against Apartheid provide for unilateral UCJ. Here, his argument fails to
persuade.
Reydams's postscript endorses Judge Guillaume's view in Arrest Warrant that free-wheeling
UCJ 'would encourage the arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful' (230, quoting paragraph 15
of Guillaume's opinion). This seems overly pessimistic. To date, there has been nothing 'arbi-
trary' in states' cautious exercises in UCJ, and the powerful have derived little discernible bene-
fit from it. Guillaume cautions that unilateral UCJ would create 'total judicial chaos' (ibid), but
chaos would occur only if States fought over the right to try offenders under UCJ-and to date,
shamefully, States have overwhelmingly preferred to look the other way in the face of atrocities.
Even without UCJ, multiple States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over the same conduct, but
this has never led to chaos. Perhaps, in a world wracked by unpunished atrocities, a small risk of
judicial chaos may be a price worth paying.
DAVID LUBAN
Georgetown University Law Center
Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of India:fts Grasp and Reach By SK VERMA AND K KusUM (eds)
[OUP Press New Delhi 2003 832pp Indian, Rs 955 (P/bk)])
This volume edited by Verma and Kusum presents a wonderful and stimulating set of essays on
the role and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India. Since the establishment of the indepen-
dent State of India in 1947, Indian judicial systems have frequently been faced with substantial
legal and political idiosyncrasies; the present study captures the responses of the Apex Court to
many of the problematic issues that have surfaced over the past 50 years. The volume comprising
of 22 chapters, analyses a wide range of areas including fundamental rights, elections laws,
Muslim personal laws, gender and environmental justice, taxation laws, civil and criminal proce-
dure, tort law, arbitration, private and public international law. The contributors to the volume are
eminent authorities on the aforementioned subjects, and their assessment is mature and thought-
provoking. Several papers reflect the ingenious and imaginative approaches adopted by the Court
to protect the rights of the socially and economically deprived groups such as scheduled castes,
the minorities, children and women-the Shah Bano case is a striking illustration of judicial
activism where the Supreme Court intervened to protect the rights of Muslim women from the
antiquated and unjust application of Muslim personal laws (see pertinent discussion on implica-
tions of Muslim personal laws by Latifi, ch 7, 269-89 and by Sivaramayya, ch 8, 290-313).
Perhaps the most remarkable example of the Indian Supreme Court's interpretative activism
is in its approach towards the promotion of the most fundamental of human rights, the right to life.
The Court has spectacularly expanded the scope of the right of life as contained in Article 21 of
the Indian Constitution to include a right to human dignity, a right to livelihood, a right to shelter
and clothing, a right to education, and environmental rights which includes 'enjoyment of pollu-
tion-free water and for full enjoyment of life' (Jain at 36). The analysis of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on conflicts of laws, arbitration, civil and criminal law and procedure reflects the
ingenuity with which this highest judicial organ has interpreted constitutional and legislative
provisions to protect additional fundamental rights. In this regard, an examination of the case law
on such controversial and complex issues as: capital punishment (706-8), offences against women
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